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ABSTRACT
Most current distributed processing research deals with improving
the flexibility and convergence speed of algorithms for networks of
finite size with no constraints on information sharing and no concept
for expected levels of signal privacy. In this work we investigate
the concept of data privacy in unbounded public networks, where
linear codes are used to create hard limits on the number of nodes
contributing to a distributed task. We accomplish this by wrapping
local observations in a linear code and intentionally applying sym-
bol errors prior to transmission. If many nodes join the distributed
task, a proportional number of symbol errors are introduced into the
code leading to decoding failure if the code’s predefined symbol er-
ror limit is exceeded.
Index Terms: Distributed, privacy, public networks, linear codes
1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years many distributed algorithms for wireless sensor net-
works (WSNs) have been developed, primarily stemming from the
advances made in small and energy efficient processing units and
battery technology. These systems offer exciting potential for use
in applications such as seismic monitoring [1] and speech enhance-
ment [2, 3]. As concepts such as the Internet of Things (IoT) [4] ma-
tures, the wireless sensor network will become ubiquitous - nearly
any technological device in the near future will have the capability
to be a part of the IoT.
Algorithmic developments in WSNs aim to provide distributed
solutions for traditional problems such as acoustic beamforming [5,
6, 7, 8] and image enhancement [9]. Distributed sensors are ex-
ploited to collaboratively solve tasks in a manner optimal for the
data present, by sharing local observations in an unrestricted man-
ner. The rapidly growing field of distributed optimization [10] pro-
vides a framework for problems of this type and often allows for the
computation of distributed solutions that are equal in performance to
their centrally computed alternatives. However, these advances are
not without their challenges.
Many devices absorbed into the IoT, or designed as part of large-
scale public sensor networks, will have physical sensors, such as mi-
crophones or cameras, offering major concerns for the privacy of de-
vice owners, users, and the general public. Approaches such as [11]
attempt to retain privacy by performing computations in encrypted
domains, but this is often computationally expensive, particularly
relative to the low compute and low energy world of WSNs. The
methods [12, 13] focus on preserving the privacy of node observa-
tions by ensuring that other nodes do not have access to these val-
ues - only combinations of neighbourhood observations are shared.
However, this does not prevent the distributed average from being
shared across the entire network. There is still no defence against
distant nodes participating in an aggregation task that may enhance
This research was supported by a New Zealand Marsden Fund grant.
a physical signal, thereby compromising the expected privacy of this
information.
Most current literature exclusively deals with the case of
bounded physical networks and attempts to design algorithms that
converge to optimal points given all network data. However, the
WSNs considered in this work may operate over many buildings or
public spaces, forming practically unbounded networks. The recent
advances in graph signal processing and filtering [14, 15, 16] pro-
vide useful tools for applying traditional filtering concepts to graph
signals, and would be appropriate for an unbounded paradigm.
However, how this may be applied to data privacy has yet to be
investigated.
In this work, we consider dealing with effectively unbounded
public WSNs where a user may tap the network at any point to des-
ignate a query node. The task to be performed is then shared to
form a task subnet, and optimized in such a way that distant nodes
within the network can neither contribute nor observe information
shared with the query node. We aim to enforce hard limits on the
distance that data may travel through the network by wrapping mes-
sages in linear codes. By applying forced errors to the local initial
codes and performing aggregation in the codeword domain, we en-
able signal enhancement near to the query node while guaranteeing
data destruction if the task is shared with a subnet larger than the
specified threshold. This allows for a public network with privacy,
where many different users may independently access the network
for processing while maintaining an expected level of security con-
sistent with the signal type, e.g., it should not be possible to eaves-
drop across a large building but it should be possible if you are within
the same room.
The following sections are organised as follows: Section 2 sum-
marizes the notation, network setup, and aggregation technique used
in this paper; Section 3 describes linear codes for error correction;
Section 4 develops an approach for privacy-preserving data summa-
tion; Section 5 presents simulated experiments on toy data, as well
as on the practical task of acoustic beamforming for speech enhance-
ment, confirming the validity of our approach; and finally Section 6
provides some concluding thoughts.
2. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section we present the notation used throughout the paper, for-
mulate the problem we aim to solve, and summarize existing meth-
ods that are currently used to tackle this problem. We discuss that
while there are approaches that retain the privacy of individual node
messages, the ability for aggregation tasks to spread through a net-
work unchecked has not yet been addressed.
An effectively unbounded public wireless sensor network
(WSN) may be described as an undirected graph G = (V, E)
consisting of vertices, or nodes, V connected via edges E . The node
set has cardinality |V| = V . Each node is equipped with on-board
processors, two-way communication systems, and sensors for a
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specific signal processing task. We assume that communication in
our graph is undirected and contains self-loops. Scalars are denoted
with lower case regular font x, vectors are boldface lower case x,
while matrices are upper case boldface P . We use subscripts to des-
ignate that a specific variable is owned by a node and superscripts
to indicate an update index for iterative algorithms, therefore xki
describes a vector held by node i at iteration k. [x]i denotes the ith
element of vector x, [P ]i,j selects out the scalar entry at row i and
column j of matrix P . We denote selection of multiple elements
from a vector as [x]e, where e is the vector of indices from which to
select, resulting in a vector with dimensionality equal to the number
of elements selected. xT denotes vector transpose.
Each node i ∈ V holds observation data ui(t) : Z→ Rl at time
sample t. When a user wishes to begin a task, they tap a node that
will henceforth be considered the query node for that task, denoted
by the specific subscript index q. For both practical and privacy rea-
sons, the query node spreads the task to a subset Vq ⊂ V of nearby
nodes. The goal is for this subset, which forms its own connected
subnetwork Gq = (Vq, Eq) with edge set Eq ⊂ E , to collabora-
tively solve the seeded task while also limiting the ability for nodes
to join the task that are not within the task subnet. Practically, this
smaller task subnet Vq allows for more efficient computations to be
performed since information is not required to propagate through the
entire public network. For privacy purposes this reduced information
travel distance means that expected levels of privacy are more eas-
ily retained - nodes that are very distant from a query node should
not have access to tasks seeded at the query node. However, enforc-
ing the size of subnet Vq is not trivial, particularly if some nodes
become compromised and actively wish to spread tasks further than
intended.
Formally, we consider an aggregation process where informa-
tion that has an expected level of privacy, such as an acoustic signal
that is assumed to decay with distance as it propagates through air,
is combined in a distributed manner as the weighted sum∑
i∈Vq
aiui, (1)
where ui is observed data at each node i, the time index t has been
omitted due to the aggregate of each sample being computed inde-
pendently, and ai is some scalar. Specific examples of these scalars
could be ai = 1 ∀i ∈ Vq , which corresponds to a simple summation,
or ai = 1/Vq ∀i ∈ Vq , which would result in a uniform average of
observations.
In order to compute the weighted summation (1) in a distributed
manner, each node i may linearly combine data from neighbouring
nodes iteratively to produce new estimates. This may be framed
generally as
uk+1i =
∑
j∈Ni
[P k+1]i,ju
k
j ∀i ∈ Vq (2)
whereP k+1 is a mixing matrix for iteration k+1 constrained to have
a sparsity pattern according to the topology of the network, such that
P ∈ S where S = {P ∈ R|Vq|×|Vq||{i, j} /∈ Eq ⇒ [P ]i,j = 0}.
Note that P k+1 may change for each iteration, and does not neces-
sarily mix information over all neighbourhoods. Two specific cases
of the general mixing (2) frequently seen in the literature, and often
useful in practice, are routed protocols [17, 18, 19, 20] and aver-
age consensus [21, 22, 23, 24]. Since iterations may be performed
at certain nodes before others, routing protocols that remove edges
from the query subnet to form a tree topology rooted on the query
node may be implemented using (2) by ensuring mixing is performed
from leaf to parent nodes. After the routing summation is complete,
the query node will have access to the sum of all nodes within the
query subnet. In this work, we focus on summations using routed
protocols.
To retain privacy when performing iterations such as (2), recent
methods [12, 13] aim to perform neighbourhood mixing in such a
way that nodes do not directly observe data other than their own.
This maintains the privacy of observed signals between nodes, since
local observations are not explicitly shared with neighbours, but does
not limit the distance that these mixtures travel within the larger
public WSN V . If, for example, the mixture uk+1i in (6) was an
acoustic speech enhancement estimate, then this information would
be allowed to travel unboundedly within the network, allowing for
distant eavesdropping.
3. LINEAR CODES OVER PRIME FIELDS
Linear error correcting codes, or simply linear codes, e.g., [25, 26],
are an important class of forward error correcting codes used to pro-
tect information transmission or storage from symbol errors by using
redundancy. They are defined over a finite vector space Fnr , where
Fr is a finite field of order r. The number of elements r must be a
prime power, i.e., r = ps where p is a prime number and s is a pos-
itive integer. In this work we limit ourselves to prime fields, where
s = 1 =⇒ r = p. The following definition holds:
Definition 1 (Linear code). A linear code C is a code in Fnp for
which, whenever x,y ∈ C, then ax + by ∈ C, for all a, b ∈ Fp,
i.e., C is a linear subspace of Fnp .
A linear code C defines an encoder map Epl,n : F
l
p → Fnp from
an l-dimensional message m ∈ Flp to an n-dimensional codeword
c ∈ Fnp . This encoder map is usually computed using the generator
matrix G ∈ Fl×np , where encoding is performed as
c = Gm. (3)
The corresponding decoder map Dpn,l : F
n
p → Flp recovers the orig-
inal message m from the codeword c. Linear codes are typically
denoted as [n, l, d] codes, where n is the length of the codeword, l
is the length of the message to be encoded, and d refers to the mini-
mum Hamming distance between any two codewords. Every linear
code satisfies the Singleton bound l+ d ≤ n+1, where 1 ≤ l ≤ n.
Given the Hamming distance d, a linear code may correctly decode
a corrupted codeword c˜ provided that fewer than d/2 symbol errors
occur.
We assume the observation ui ∈ Rl at each node i ∈ V has
entries bounded in the range −y  ui  y. Given that the ob-
served data may be continuous (or stored using quantization at a
far finer level than our transmission rate would allow, so as to ap-
pear effectively continuous), a quantization step may be required
prior to coding. The observations are quantized using a uniform p-
level quantizer Ql,p resulting in p equally spaced values over the
range −y to y. We refer to the quantized observations as messages
mi = Ql,p(ui) ∈ Flp ∀i ∈ V , and their decoded approximations
as uˆi = Rl,p(Ql,p(ui)) ∈ Rl ∀i ∈ V . In the remainder of this
work we refer to Q as the quantizer and R as the dequantizer (rather
than as the decoder, to avoid confusion with the linear code decoder
Dpn,l).
4. DISTRIBUTED PRIVATE SUMMATION
In this section, we exploit linear codes in a novel way to guarantee
distributed privacy when performing processing over a WSN, where
a processing task is defined over a subset Vq ⊂ V of nodes originat-
ing from a query node q. We use linear codes to limit the range that
information may travel within the network. We accomplish this by
encoding our messages using a linear code and then applying forced
errors to the codewords prior to transmission.
As a result of Definition 1, for any linear code the sum or dif-
ference of any two codewords is also a codeword. Addition and
subtraction over Fp are performed modulo the characteristic of the
field, which is the prime number p. Since messages are encoded by a
matrix multiplication with the generatorG, the codeword associated
with the sum of two messagesm1 andm2 is the same as the sum of
the two separate encodings, i.e.,
Epl,n(m1 +m2) = G(m1 +m2)
=Gm1 +Gm2 = E
p
l,n(m1) + E
p
l,n(m2),
(4)
where addition and matrix multiplication are performed using finite
field arithmetic over the field Fp.
From (4), performing summations over the network may be
performed on codewords, rather than messages, with forced errors
present. If a node wishes to output an estimate of the private ag-
gregation procedure, only then will it decode the forcibly corrupted
codeword mixture. By controlling the number of errors introduced
and the Hamming distance of the linear code used, we effectively
bound the overall number of nodes able to participate in a distributed
task. If more nodes than the limit join a task, then more than d/2
errors are introduced resulting in erroneous decodings. For a max-
imum distance separable (MDS) linear code [25] with Hamming
distance d, the number of nodes able to join a task without affecting
the ability to decode is given by
|Vq| < d
2λ
=
n− l + 1
2λ
, (5)
where λ is the number of random errors applied to each node’s code-
word locally and independently.
Algorithm 1 describes the Distributed Private Summation
(DPS) procedure. For this scenario, we require a message quan-
tizer/dequantizer to map between Rl and Flp, and a linear en-
coder/decoder to map between Flp and Fnp . The parameter l is
the dimensionality of the observation. A predefined code length
n and a predefined number of symbol errors λ are also necessary.
Given these requirements, each node determines λ codeword symbol
indices that will be corrupted by error.
Nodes observe signals ui ∀i ∈ V , and a summation task is de-
fined over a task subnet Vq ⊂ V . A set of edges T 0q is determined
that converts the general task graph into a tree graph rooted at the
query node q. Messages mi ∀i ∈ V are formed by mapping ob-
servations to the finite field F lp, where message values must satisfy
|Vq|max(‖m0‖∞, . . . , ‖m|Vq|‖∞) ≤ p to guarantee summation
overflow does not occur. Initial codewords c0i are computed by en-
coding messages mi, ∀i ∈ V , and λ symbol errors are applied to
each codeword randomly and independently. We then begin itera-
tively summing through the tree, from leaf nodes to the root. At
each iteration k we use the tree edges T kq to define a leaf node set
Lkq , a set of leaf parent nodes Pkq , and a set of all edges connected
to leaf nodes denoted Fkq . Each leaf parent stores the sum of its own
codeword and the codewords of all its leaf neighbours (defined as the
union of the leaf parent’s neighbours and the current leaf nodes) as
Algorithm 1 Distributed Private Summation
Require: Task subnet Gq; prime field characteristic p; message
quantizer Ql,p; message dequantizer Rl,p; linear encoder Epl,n;
linear decoder Dpn,l; code length n; number of errors λ
Symbol error index vectors ei = a ∼ U(n, λ) ∀i ∈ V
Nodes observe ui ∈ Rl ∀i ∈ V
Summation defined over task subnet (Vq, Eq) ⊆ (V, E)
Construct tree edge set T 0q ⊆ Eq rooted at query node q
mi = Ql,p(ui), |Vq|max(‖m0‖∞, . . . , ‖mn‖∞) ≤ p
Encode c0i = E
p
l,n(mi) ∈ Fnp ∀i ∈ Vq
Apply errors [c0i ]ei = b ∼ U(p, λ) ∀i ∈ Vq
k = 0
while T kq 6= ∅ do
Define leaf nodes Lkq , leaf parents Pkq , and leaf edges Fkq =
{(i, j)|j ∈ Ni ∀i ∈ Lkq} using T kq
[P k+1]i,j = 1 for i == j,
[P k+1]i,j = 1 for j ∈ Ni ∩ Lkq ∀i ∈ Pkq ,
[P k+1]i,j = 0 otherwise.
T k+1q ← T kq \ Fkq
ck+1i ←
∑
j∈Ni [P
k+1]i,jc
k
j ∀i ∈ Vq
k ← k + 1
end while
uSumq = Rl,p(D
p
n,l(c
k
q ))
ck+1i . The tree edge set is then updated by removing the current leaf
edge set Fkq from the current tree edge set. The final output at the
query node q is the decoded and dequantized codeword after sum-
mation termination. Note that the total network summation is only
available to the query node in this scheme.
5. SIMULATED EXPERIMENTS
In this section we investigate Algorithm 1 when applied in two sim-
ulated scenarios, using Reed-Solomon (RS) codes [27]. In the first
scenario, we seed nodes with random two dimensional message vec-
tors. The mean squared error of the sum, as read at the network
query node, is then plotted as a function of nodes contributing to the
task. The second scenario applies private summation to distributed
audio enhancement, specifically the aggregation step of a delay-and-
sum (DSB) and minimum variance distortionless response (MVDR)
beamformer. The signal-to-noise ratio of the resulting output is then
plotted as a function of task nodes.
The network consists of a varying number of nodes uniformly
randomly scattered in a 2D circular surface with radius 25 m. The
nodes have a communication range of 10 m. The binary adjacency
matrix for the network graph is then constructed, where connected
node pairs are represented with edges of value 1 while unconnected
pairs have edge value 0.
5.1. Toy Data
In this toy scenario, nodes are each assigned a random integer mes-
sage mi ∈ Flp ∀i ∈ Vq , where each dimension is drawn from the
discrete uniform distribution U{0, p}. We use a prime field with
characteristic p = 251 so that our messages may be stored within 8
bits. A random node is then selected as the query node q. We use
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Fig. 1: MSE versus number of task nodes for toy data summation,
for varying levels of codeword redundancy.
a fixed codeword length of n = 64 while varying the message di-
mensionality, and correspondingly the codeword Hamming distance.
Three message lengths of l = 16, 32, and 48 are implemented in or-
der to compare the point at which decoding breaks down. This gives
a redundancy of 300%, 100%, and 33.3%, respectively. Nodes each
introduce one symbol error to their own message prior to beginning
the summation procedure. Since the generator matrix G for the RS
code used is in standard form, it is possible to naı¨vely attempt de-
coding past the point at which the RS code breaks down by simply
reading the first two codeword dimensions. This is used to compute
the mean squared error (MSE) after coding fails.
Figure 1 plots the MSE of the decoded two dimensional message
sum as a function of task nodes. For all code lengths we see decoding
error appearing past the expected point of d/2 = 8, 16, and 24
nodes, respectively, since at this point there are approximately d/2
symbol errors in the final summation total.
5.2. Private Beamforming
In this private beamforming setup nodes observe acoustic signals
originating from a talker located at the centre of the simulated en-
vironment surface. A second interfering talker along with indepen-
dent additive white Gaussian noise at each node is also present. The
observed signals at each node, sampled synchronously at 8 kHz, are
calculated using the acoustic transfer function vector d computed by
assuming a free field model for both talkers. Beamforming is ac-
complished using an estimated covariance matrix over all nodes R
to compute the optimal weight vector w∗ = (R−1d)/(dHR−1d).
The task-specific weighting vector w∗ may be computed either cen-
trally or in a distributed manner [10, 28, 29], and we assume that
no private data leakage occurs here. For the DSB scenario, the co-
variance matrix R was assumed to be diagonal, while the MVDR
beamformer exploited the full matrix.
We process local signals by taking 50% overlapping time-
domain blocks and applying a Hann window prior to taking the
short-time Fourier transform. This gives us frequency-domain sig-
nals denoted xi ∈ Cl at all nodes i ∈ Vq within the query subnet.
We denote the stacked collection of these distributed signals as the
matrix Xq ∈ CVq×l. The complex weight vector w∗ ∈ C|Vq| may
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Fig. 2: SNR versus number of task nodes for conventional and pri-
vate beamformers, with codeword redundancy of 13.8%.
then be used to form signal aggregation across the network as
sˆ = w∗TXq =
∑
i∈Vq
[w∗]ixi =
∑
i∈Vq
aiui, (6)
whereui = real([w∗]ixi) ∈ Rl is a task weighing at node i applied
to the signal at this node to produce observation data ui, and sˆ is
the enhanced signal sample. These observations are then quantized
to give messages mi ∈ Flp ∀i ∈ Vq . We use a prime field with
characteristic p = 1021 so that our messages may be stored within
10 bits. A block size of l = 224 is used, while the codeword length
is n = 255. This results in a Hamming distance of d = 32, and a
transmission redundancy of 13.8%.
Figure 2 plots the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) as a function of
contributing task nodes. Initially, as more nodes are included in
the beamforming task we see an increase in performance of the en-
hanced signal. This boost in SNR drops after d/2 = 16 nodes are in-
cluded in the task, since at this point decoding fails to output the cor-
rect summation total. In contrast we see that with, no errors applied
the DSB and MVDR performance continues to rise as more nodes
are included, compromising privacy. We note that the point at which
information destruction occurs is entirely controlled by the system
designer, and depends on the node density of the network (i.e., the
number of nodes per meter that the codewords travel through), the
Hamming distance of the code used, and the number of errors intro-
duced at each node. This may be set to impose dropoff faster than
natural acoustic signal decay, guaranteeing privacy.
6. CONCLUSION
We conclude that public WSN privacy can be ensured by limiting
information propagation throughout an unbounded network, where
tasks are seeded by user-accessed query nodes. We have applied er-
rors to locally encoded data observations, allowing for distributed
aggregation that is performed in a manner that guarantees informa-
tion destruction when too many nodes contribute to the task. This
enforces a level of privacy proportional to the distance a signal trav-
els through the network. Our approach is flexible, scalable, and may
be used in combination with other existing protocols that encourage
local node privacy.
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